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I. INTRODUCTION
China's unprecedented economic growth and rapid urbanization
in the past three decades has exerted a heavy toll on the country's envi-
ronment. According to the 2010 Official Report on the Land and
Resources released in October 2011, in 182 Chinese cities that monitor
ground water quality, 40.44% of the ground water was graded four and
16.7% was graded five.' According to the National Standard for
Ground Water Quality, Grade Four means the water should primarily
be used for agricultural and industrial purposes, and can be used as
drinking water only after proper treatment, while Grade Five means
the water is not suitable for drinking.2 This is devastating news to the
over 400 cities which rely on ground water as their drinking water
source out of China's 655 cities.3 In particular, cities in northern
China rely heavily upon ground water. Currently, 65% of the water
used daily by the people, 50% of the water for industrial use, and 33%
of the water used for agricultural irrigation of cities in northern China
comes primarily from ground water.4 In a study released in February
2012, researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change said al-
though China has made substantial progress in reducing air pollution,
the economic impact of air pollution has jumped from $22 billion in
1975 to $112 billion in 2005.5 Acknowledging "the damages are even
greater than previously thought," the MIT researchers concluded that
China has already become the world's largest emitter of mercury, car-
bon dioxide and other pollutants, and only recently started to monitor
ozone.6
1. Libin Wang, Official Report on the Land Resources: The Ground Water Quality of
Over Half Chinese Cities Were Rated IV and V, NEWS.COM, October 19, 2011, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-10/19/c_111108310.htm.
2. Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Guo Jian Biao Zhun Di Xia Shui Zhi Liang Biao
Zhun GB/T 14848-93 ( T7J';G:M GB/T 14848-93) [Quality
Standard for Ground Water of the National Standards of the People's Republic of China,
GB/T 14848-93(approved by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection
and Quarantine, 1993, effective 1994) (China), available at http://kjs.mep.gov.cn/pvobj-
cache/pvobjidB425DF8639DFD8C9839FAFC2297305244CDBO200/filename/WO2006102
7512167894817.pdf.
3. Ground Sinking Occurred In Over 50 Cities Across China, PEOPLE.COM.CN,
November 17, 2011, available at http://www.people.com.cn/h/2011/1117/c25408-38512842
37.html.
4. Id.
5. Wendy Koch, MIT: China's Pollution Costs $112B In Annual Health Care, USA
TODAY (February 14, 2012) http://content.usatoday.com/communities/greenhouse/post/2012/
02/chinas-growth-worsens-air-pollution-hikes-health-costs/1#.TzuclSNJIU.
6. Id.
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Set against the backdrop of China's daunting environmental
challenges, this article will first discuss how the environmental justice
issue manifests itself on Chinese soil and how its evolvement differs
from the American experience. This discussion will be followed by an
analysis on how environmental public interest litigation, inspired by
citizen suits in the U.S., has been fermenting in China and advocated
by environmentalists as a new approach to broaden and strengthen ac-
cess to environmental justice. The article will then move on to analyze
three high-profile environmental public interest cases recently brought
by a Chinese NGO and a local environmental protection agency, re-
spectively, at two specialized environmental courts, and discuss the
important innovations and limitations of these cases. The article will
conclude with some further thoughts on the direction of China's envi-
ronmental public interest litigation experiment and how it can be
effectively employed to strengthen environmental governance and en-
sure environmental justice for all.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT
The concept of environmental justice in China has its own dis-
tinctive meanings, and is generally understood very differently from its
original racial and income-based meanings defined by the environmen-
tal justice history of the United States.7 Although China has 55 ethnic
minority groups, the Chinese government has adopted a strict racial
equality policy since its foundation in 1949, aiming to create a harmo-
nious relationship among different ethnic groups and to minimize any
potential conflicts.8 Unlike in the United States, where Hispanics
often engage in labor-intensive industries and therefore, are likely to
suffer the negative consequences of pollution, minority groups in China
are not discriminated when pursuing employment opportunities as a
result of the "racial neutral" national policy.9 Polluting industries and
clean energy projects can both be sited in minority regions because of a
7. For example, Naikang Tsao described a striking feature of the American landscape
as the prevalence of toxic waste dumps in low-income communities and communities of
racial minorities. See Naikang Tsao, Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizens' Guide
to Combating the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 366, 366
(1992). The author discussed the environmental justice issue in the Chinese context also in
a chapter titled "The Impacts of Climate Change on Indigenous Populations in China and
Legal Remedies," co-authored with Wenxuan Yu and Pong Dong, for the book CLIMATE
CHANGE AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE SEARCH FOR LEGAL REMEDIES, edited by Randall S.
Abate and Elizabeth Kronk, Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming March 2013.
8. Ruixue Quan, Establishing China's Environmental Justice Study Models, 14 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 461, 467 (2002).
9. Id. at 468.
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particular region's natural conditions, rather than racial
considerations. 10
In mixed income communities, it is possible for wealth to play a
role in affecting plaintiffs' chance of escaping pollution with richer re-
sidents moving away and leaving their poorer neighbors to bring
lawsuits on their own." When it comes to the intricate relationship
between income level and environmental justice, there is no systematic
evidence suggesting, from a microcosmic view, that low-income com-
munities receive more environmental burdens and less environmental
benefits because of their income status. 12 The dense population and
existing formatted urban structure have effectively inhibited the trend
of wealthier people congregating in environmentally more advanta-
geous areas and driving lower-income population to environmentally
less desirable regions.' 3 Polluting industries, landfills, toxic facilities
and other pollution sources in China's urban areas were not placed ac-
cording to race or income, but on the need and convenience of disposal
according to government urban planning. 14 Because of the racial and
income neutral nature of China's environmental justice issue, it seems
the concept of environmental justice should be understood more
broadly as referring to the interests of the public at large, rather than
a notion that all racial groups should bear the burdens and risks of
hazardous waste facilities equitably.' 5
My own experience of overseeing an environmental justice ex-
change program between China and the United States seems to
confirm this broader view of environmental justice in the Chinese con-
text. In 2009, Vermont Law School was awarded a federal grant to
support a U.S.-China exchange program for young professionals work-
ing in the field of environmental justice. 16 Funded by the Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) of the State Department, this
educational and cultural exchange was expected to provide leadership
training opportunities to eighteen Chinese and American fellows (9
from each country), particularly members of minority groups, who are
10. Id. at 473.
11. Rachel E. Stern, From Dispute to Decision: Suing Polluters in China, THE CHINA
QUARTERLY, 206, 308 (2011).
12. Quan, supra note 8, at 474.
13. Id. at 475.
14. Id.
15. Ke Jian, Environmental Justice: Can An American Discourse Make Sense in
Chinese Environmental Law?, 24 TEMP. J. Sci. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 253 (2005).
16. Final Program Report of Vermont Law School Environmental Justice Young
Fellows Exchange Program, p. 1, March 31, 2011 (on file with author).
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active in advocating for environmental justice.17 The fellows were ex-
pected to jointly examine the environmental burdens, including
climate change impacts, on minority and low-income populations in
both countries through a six-week exchange (three weeks in the United
States and three weeks in China) and design of individual projects to
advance environmental justice efforts in their communities.18
There were 52 applications from Chinese citizens for the 9 slots.
The Chinese applicants are from a diverse array of backgrounds all
across the country, including leading environmental NGO activists,
well-known environmental law scholars and researchers, judges, gov-
ernment officials, scientists as well as environmental lawyers.19
Several applicants were members of ethnic minority populations and
many came from relatively poor and underdeveloped areas of China.20
As the person overseeing this exchange program, I was able to
interview around 20 finalists out of the 52 Chinese applicants face-to-
face or over the telephone to determine the candidacy of the 9 Chinese
fellows. When asked about their understanding of the term "environ-
mental justice," a few of the 20 finalists were able to articulate the
traditional racial and income aspects of it as defined in the United
States; however, most of them interpreted "environmental justice" as
"better environmental governance." With "better environmental gov-
ernance," the environmental laws are well-drafted and strictly-
complied with and enforced, the pollution victims can obtain adequate
compensation through legal channels, the general public can effec-
tively participate in government environmental decision-making, and
the environmental quality can be gradually improved for the benefit of
all members of the society.
The exchange program helped deepen the fellows' understand-
ing of the possibilities of redefining environmental justice in China; a
country whose history, political and legal system, and social develop-
ment are drastically different from the United States. The exchange
enabled fellows to have a vibrant discussion on the Chinese character-
istics of environmental justice, since the topic is an emerging concept
open for interpretation. Some of the fellows perceived urban-rural ine-
quality, rather than racial profiling, as an important manifestation of
environmental justice challenges in China. Others observed that the
environmental justice endeavor in China was driven by the perception
of preventing and remedying the negative impacts caused by people on
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1-4.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id.
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the ecosystem and public health in general. This approach was noted
over dedication to alleviating disproportionate environmental burdens
on low-income communities and communities of color as commonly un-
derstood in the American context.21 Throughout the course of the
exchange, environmental lawsuits brought on behalf of the public in-
terest emerged as a hot topic as the Chinese fellows explored options to
hold polluters and non-performing government agencies accountable
and to improve access to environmental justice.
Even though environmental justice is interpreted more broadly
in China, it has several distinctive characteristics: 1) Environmental
disparities between eastern, more developed regions and western, less
developed regions; 2) Environmental disparities as reflected in urban-
rural inequality; and 3) Certain groups of the population, such as mi-
grant workers, are more vulnerable to environmental risks because
they have fewer resources to seek redress.
A. Environmental Disparities Between Eastern and Western Regions
While geographically Da Xing An Ling - Tai Hang Mountain -
Xuefeng Mountain serves as the line of demarcation between eastern
and western China, such division was shaped by a variety of factors
including historical development, natural conditions, and human activ-
ities.22 While Western regions have relatively rich natural resources,
they are generally underdeveloped, economically disadvantaged, and
suffer serious environmental destruction. On the other hand, while
Eastern regions have limited natural resources, they have higher level
of industrialization, urbanization, and modernization than their West-
ern counterparts. 23
Historically, Western regions have made significant contribu-
tions and sacrifices towards the economic development of Eastern
regions and the entire country by transferring their abundant mineral
reserves to the East free of charge, while leaving behind serious envi-
ronmental damage as a result of these mineral and resources
extraction activities. 24 In addition, after the Reform and Opening Up
policy was instituted in the late 1970s, with natural resources supplied
by Western regions and preferential policies granted by the central
21. Id. at 6.
22. Dengqiao Zhang, Xi Bu Kai Fa Zhong De Huan Jing Zheng Yi Wen Ti Yan Jiu
[Analysis of Environmental Justice Issues During the Course of Developing Western
China], 26 JouRNAL OF JISHOU UNivERSYTy 56, 58 (2005) (China).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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government, Eastern regions spearheaded in economic development,
while their Western counterparts were not compensated sufficiently
and therefore, lagged far behind in economic development. 25
As economic disparity among different regions continues to
widen in contemporary China, environmental enforcement facilities,
competence, and efficiency could potentially vary significantly from re-
gion to region.26 An example may be found in examining the
enforcement of environmental information disclosure. In a recent sur-
vey conducted in 113 selected cities across China to evaluate how
effectively local governments disclose environmental information to
the general public, provinces in the Eastern part of China outperform
their counterparts in central China, and provinces in central China
outperform their counterparts in Western China.27 Out of these 113
cities, the top two are Ningbo of Zhejiang Province and Shenzhen of
Guangdong Province, both of which are located along China's eastern
coast.28
In addition, wealthier regions are generally able to devote more
financial and technical resources to protecting the local environment
than their poorer counterparts. 29 The more affluent regions in eastern
China are able to devote more funding to environmental protection and
therefore enjoy better environmental quality within the regions, while
their western counterparts are trapped in the cycle of exacerbating pol-
lution and increasing poverty.30
B. Environmental Disparities Between Urban and Rural Areas
As observed by some fellows of the environmental justice ex-
change program, significant environmental disparities exist between
China's urban and rural areas as a result of urban-rural inequality.
Urban-rural inequality is a pervasive phenomenon in developing coun-
tries, and it is particularly visible in China.3 ' Compared to their urban
counterparts, rural residents in China have limited income sources, ed-
25. Id.
26. Quan, supra note 8, at 480.
27. Fang Zhang, Progress Slow for Pollution Data Transparency, CHINA.ORG.CN,
January 17, 2012, available at http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2012-01/17/content
24428092.htm.
28. Id.
29. Quan, supra note 8, at 480.
30. Zhang, supra note 22.
31. Hai Jin, Zou Xiang Cheng Xiang Huan Jing Zheng Yi: Yi Fa Zhi Bian Ge Wei Shi
Jian [Achieving Environmental Justice in Both Urban and Rural Areas in China: From the
Lens of Legal Reform], 10 LEGAL STUDY MAGAZINE 74, 76 (2009) (China).
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ucational facilities, employment opportunities, and social security.
Such inequality has exerted a profound impact on the environmental
protection efforts in rural areas.32 Vice Minister Ganjie Li of China's
Ministry of Environmental Protection, openly expressed concern over
environmental disparities between urban and rural areas as a result of
"putting the emphasis only on urban areas, industry and point source
pollution, while ignoring rural areas, agriculture and nonpoint source
pollution" when it comes to environmental protection.33 According to
Vice Minister Li, the rural areas in China produced over nine billion
tons of sewage and 280 million tons of municipal solid waste each year,
and most of them are randomly discharged without treatment. 34 The
vast majority of China's rural villages lack basic environmental
infrastructure.35
Many cities treat rivers as pollution discharge channels, and
discharged pollutants cause frequent outbreak of environment-related
diseases in rural areas along the rivers and coasts. This is particularly
a problem in rural villages along the Huai River watershed as well as
eastern coastal areas where certain communities have become known
as the "Cancer Villages".36 Xiao Jia Dian Village in Feicheng City,
Shandong Province is an example.37 Feicheng City is a newly-industri-
alized city engaged primarily in coal mining, coking, papermaking, and
brewing; all of which are pollution-causing industries.38 These indus-
tries discharged wastewater to the local Dawen River, which caused
many sections of the Dawen River watershed to have a water quality
graded less than five,39 according to the water quality monitoring re-
ports from Feicheng Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau
32. Id.
33. Jianrong Qie, Rural Pollutants Account for Half of China's Pollutants and Need to
Be Regulated Immediately, LEGAL DAILY, March 29, 2011, available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/legal/2011-03/29/c_121242239.htm.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Shuming Wang & Yan Zhang, Wo Guo Shui Wu Ran Yu Huan Jing Zheng Yi Yan
Jiu [Analysis on China's Water Pollution and Environmental Justice], 11 JOURNAL OF
HoHAI UNIVERSiTY 50, 51 (2009) (China).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 51-52.
39. For a water quality graded less than five, it means the water cannot be used
for industrial or agricultural purposes. See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Guo
Jian Biao Zhun Di Biao Shui Huan Jing Zhi Liang Biao Zhun GB 3838-2002
(Tt f itW4GB 3838-2002) [Environmental Quality
Standards for Surface Water of the National Standards of the People's Republic of China,
GB 3838-2002 (promulgated by the State Environmental Protection Administration and
the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, 2002,
effective 2002) (China).
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(EPB).40 In particular, the level of nitrite, a carcinogen, in the water
far exceeded what is permitted by the national standard. Mter exten-
sive fieldwork, scientists preliminarily confirmed that the high cancer
rate among Xiao Jia Dian's villagers was closely connected with local
water pollution.4 1
The pervasive environmental problems in China's rural areas
can be attributed to the urban centralism in environmental legislation
and enforcement. 4 2 Compared to a relatively comprehensive set of leg-
islation protecting the urban environment, there is extremely limited
legislation targeting the rural environment.4 3 For example, China's
rural areas face a variety of significant environmental challenges such
as soil pollution, nonpoint source pollution, and transfer of pollution
from cities to the countryside, but relevant legislations remain va-
cant.44 In addition, existing environmental laws, regulations and
standards were enacted primarily to prevent and control urban and
industrial point source pollution.45
Although some laws and regulations established general princi-
ples related to rural environmental protection, these provisions lack
enforceability and cannot effectively handle the increasingly severe
and complicated rural environmental problems. 4 6 An additional chal-
lenge to China's rural environmental governance is the weak
enforcement of the environmental laws and regulations. Most of the
provincial-level Environmental Protection Bureaus have not estab-
lished a division devoted to rural environmental protection; most of the
rural townships do not have an environmental protection office and
lack necessary monitoring and enforcement capacity.4 7
C. Migrant Workers As A Vulnerable Group to Environmental Risks
The issue of migrant workers has become one of the most con-
tentious social issues in China in recent years. Migrant workers,
termed by some as the "peasantry workers," generally refers to those
Chinese rural residents who have very limited employment opportuni-
ties at home and therefore leave their lands for the urban areas that
40. Wang & Zhang, supra note 36, at 52.
41. Id. at 51-52.
42. Jin, supra note 31, at 74.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Jianrong Qie, supra note 33.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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demand labor for low-paying jobs.48 The vast majority of migrant
workers can only be employed in labor-intensive occupations because
they lack proper education, training, and social connections. 4 9 Accord-
ing to a survey conducted in 2006, out of the more than 2,000 migrant
workers in Zhejiang Province, one of the most economically developed
provinces in eastern China and a major province importing migrant
workers, most of the migrant workers surveyed have only junior high
(50.3%) or high school (31.9%) education.50 Among migrants workers
aged between 16 and 23 years old, 60.3% only have a junior high school
level education or even lower.5 1 These young migrant workers lack the
necessary professional knowledge and skills and therefore, work pri-
marily in labor-intensive industries and encounter significant
difficulty in learning new skill sets to improve their career potential. 52
Although migrant workers have made important contributions
to China's urbanization, as well as miraculous economic achievements,
the fact that most of them are employed in low-paying jobs with less-
than-desirable working conditions, such as construction, landfill treat-
ment, incineration, and sewage treatment, exposes them to more
pollution and makes them particularly vulnerable to occupational dis-
eases.53 According to a 2010 survey by the Ministry of Health
regarding the occupational health situations of younger-generation mi-
grant workers, 60% of the nearly 100 million younger-generation
migrant workers are employed in industries that pose high risks for
occupational health problems. 54 In recent years, over 80% of the occu-
pational disease patients are migrant workers and the incidents in
which a large number of migrant workers contracted occupational dis-
eases around the same time have occurred frequently.5 5 In
Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong Province in southern China,
the occupational diseases contracted in the past five years include pri-
marily pneumoconiosis, occupational poisoning (e.g. lead poisoning)
and hearing impairment caused by industrial noise, according to a sur-
48. Quan, supra note 8, at 484-485.
49. Id. at 485.
50. Xuefei Huang, The Investigation Report on the Migrant Worker Issue, MINGONG
123, August 29, 2011, available at http://www.mingongl23.com/news/13/201108/5489543
719805b65.html.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Quan, supra note 8, at 485.
54. Jie Lin & Jianming Zhou, Migrant Workers Become the Primary Patients of
Occupational Disease, YANG CHENG EVENING NEws, September 8, 2011, available at http://
www.ycwb.com/ePaper/ycwb/html/2011-09/08/content_1205994.htm.
55. Id.
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vey published by the Guangzhou Institute of Occupational Disease
Prevention and Treatment.56
In practice, it is very difficult for migrant workers to enforce
their legitimate rights to occupational disease-related compensation
from their employers because of the obstacles in obtaining official as-
sessment of occupational disease.5 7 For example, Shenzhen, one of the
wealthiest cities in southern China, requires a potential victim of occu-
pational disease to first prove the employment relationship between
himself and the employer before he can apply for official assessment on
whether he has occupational disease.5 8 However, many businesses re-
fuse to sign labor contracts with migrant workers because they do not
wish to establish a formal employment relationship that will lead to
higher costs for the employers. Further, many migrant workers either
lack the consciousness to safeguard their own rights or cannot afford
insisting that their employers sign a labor contract before they are
hired because they are under pressure to get a job.59 Therefore, most
migrant workers do not have a labor contract, and usually lack other
means to prove the existence of an employment relationship with the
employer.60 According to a survey conducted by a sociology professor
at Peking University on more than 120 migrant workers who work for
the construction industry in Shenzhen, none of these migrant workers
had a valid labor contract with their employers.6 '
There are other restrictions on migrant workers' rights to claim
compensation for occupational diseases. For example, Guangdong
Province, one of the major manufacturing hubs in China, has a rule
which prohibits a worker from seeking compensation from a former
employer for an occupational disease that was likely developed during
his former employment if he has not worked for the former employ-
ment for over two years. 62 It can sometimes take years to show the
56. Id.
57. Boxin Yuan, Enterprises in Shenzhen Refused to Sign Labor Contracts and
Migrant Workers Suffered Enormous Difficulties to Obtain Official Assessment for Their
Occupational Diseases, NEWS.CN, December 21, 2009, available at http://news.xinhuanet.
com/local/2009-12/21/content 12679200.htm.
58. Id.
59. Yingting Lian, Only 20% of the Migrant Workers Have Signed Labor Contracts, and
Protection of the Rights and Interests of Migrant Workers Should Be Concerned, LEGAL
DAILY, May 27, 2007, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2007-05/27/content
6158346.htm.
60. Boxin Yuan, supra note 57.
61. Id.
62. Guangdong Sheng Guan Yu Jin Yi Bu Wang Shan Wo Sheng
Gong Shang Bao Xian Zhi Du You Guan Wen Ti De Tong Zhi
(i'= Ih~igg J ~fi19 ) [Notice on Relevant Issues
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symptoms of an occupational disease, thus this rule will likely have a
detrimental impact on migrant workers' legitimate rights to work-re-
lated compensation.
The challenges faced by migrant workers in protecting their
health and work safety have drawn widespread attention, including
international efforts to improve their access to justice. For example,
Vermont Law School collaborated with Sun Yat-sen University Law
School (SYSU) in Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong Province,
to launch the Environmental and Worker Health and Safety Advocacy
Initiative (the Initiative) at SYSU's existing environmental law clinic
(the "Clinic").68 Through the Initiative, the Clinic trains SYSU law
students to provide legal and advocacy services to migrant workers and
pollution victims in Guangzhou and its surrounding areas in work-
place safety cases. The cases that SYSU law students are trained to
handle include those involving environmental health and safety is-
sues.64 By applying the laws and regulations they have learned
regarding workers' rights related to workplace injury and occupational
diseases, the students provide face-to-face legal consultations to mi-
grant workers at industrial parks, conduct trainings on relevant
Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) issues, draft legal documents
for those who fight for the compensation they are entitled to, and even
represent the workers before labor arbitration committees and
judges.6 5
The Clinic has actively engaged in legal and policy reform ini-
tiatives that will enhance protection of the migrant workers by
leveraging the insights and experiences it has accrued through provid-
ing legal and advocacy services to migrant workers. As mentioned
above, Guangdong Province has a rule which permits workers to seek
compensation for occupational diseases contracted in former employ-
ment only within two years after they have left the former
employment. 66 This rule not only creates significant barriers for mi-
Regarding Further Improvement of Guangdong Province's Work Injury Insurance System]
(promulgated by the Labor and Social Welfare Department of Guangdong Province, 2008,
effective 2008) (China).
63. Quarterly Program Report of Vermont Law School Environmental Advocacy
Initiative for China, p. 3, December 31, 2011 (on file with author).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 5.
66. Guangdong Sheng Guan Yu Jin Yi Bu Wang Shan Wo Sheng
Gong Shang Bao Xian Zhi Du You Guan Wen Ti De Tong Zhi
(-ffgg JD [Notice on Relevant Issues
Regarding Further Improvement of Guangdong Province's Work Injury Insurance System]
(promulgated by the Labor and Social Welfare Department of Guangdong Province, 2008,
effective 2008) (China).
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grant workers to pursue their legitimate claims for compensation, but
is in conflict with the national law, which does not impose a two-year
limit.6 7 The Clinic has worked with two other institutions to submit
their opinions and suggestions to the Department of Human Resources
and Social Security, the Legislative Affairs Office, the Provincial High
People's Court and the Provincial Union of Guangdong Province. 68
Specifically, they requested to revise this rule, requested that courts
not deny workers' compensation applications on an individual basis,
and requested the Provincial Union to propose a draft revision of this
rule.6 9 While the Department of Human Resources and Social Security
still refuses to revise this rule, the Provincial Union plans to question
their decision at this year's Guangdong Provincial People's Congress.
Additionally, the Legislative Affairs Office helped arrange a meeting
between the Clinic, the other institutions, and senior officials of the
Work Injury Division of the Department of Human Resources and So-
cial Security to discuss and debate the legitimacy and reasonableness
of this rule because of the Clinic's concerted efforts to push for legisla-
tive changes. 70
III. EMPLOYING ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC INTEREST LITGIATION TO
IMPROVE ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
In order to address the country's formidable environmental
challenges as well as its citizens' desire for environmental justice,
China started to develop its environmental legislative framework at
the end of 1970s, and has enacted an extensive set of environmental
laws, regulations, and rules in the past 30 years. According to Profes-
sor Jin Wang of Peking University, the enacted environmental statutes
account for over 10% of all the statutes passed by the Chinese national
legislature in the past three decades.7 1 However, many of these laws
were broadly drafted, and suffer from significant enforcement difficul-
ties that characterize modern Chinese legislations more generally. 72
67. Quarterly Program Report, supra note 63. at 11.
68. Email exchange on April 19, 2012 with the professor in charge of Sun Yat-sen
University's Labor Law Clinic (on file with the author).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Jin Wang, Remarks at the Special Third Forum on Legal Mechanisms To Ensure
Fulfillment of the Environmental Protection Tasks Under the 12th Five-Year Plan,
September 21, 2011. The notes of this event are available at http://www.acef.com.cn/news/
lhhdt/36482.shtml.
72. William Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, Limits of the Law in Addressing China's
Environmental Dilemma, 16 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 125, 127 (1997).
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Compounded by local government's ruthless pursuit of economic devel-
opment, weak regulatory infrastructure, lack of financial and human
resources, limited engagement of civil society and a relatively weak ju-
diciary,73 China faces enormous challenges to bridge the alarming gap
between laws "on-the-book" and actual enforcement on the ground. In
order to address the enforcement issue, in particular as a way to rectify
lax enforcement by administrative agencies, the role of the judiciary, in
particular with respect to allowing for environmental public interest
litigation, has been emphasized to give teeth to China's environmental
legislations.74
In recent years, a "green court movement" has emerged in
China. There are 86 specialized environmental courts, tribunals and
panels established in 14 provinces (close to half of all provinces in
China) across the country as of October 2011.75 These specialized envi-
ronmental courts and tribunals help streamline the trial process of
environmental cases, allow the cases to be heard by judges and envi-
ronmental experts with enhanced technical expertise, and liberalize
the standing to encourage public interest lawsuits that regular courts
commonly do not accept under existing Chinese law.7 6 Such a "bottom-
up" activist approach77 by the judiciary is not commonly seen in China,
and will likely have ripple effects across other areas of law and hold
73. Jingjing Liu & Adam Moser, Environmental Law-China, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SUSTAINABILITY VOL. 3: THE LAw AND POLITICS OF SUSTAINABILITY 220, 222 (Klaus
Bosselmann, Daniel Fogel, & J.B. Ruhl eds., 2011).
74. For example, the Supreme People's Court issued Several Opinions on Providing
Judicial Guarantee and Services for Accelerating the Transformation of the Economic
Development Mode, which requires the courts to properly hear various types of
environmental protection disputes, to timely adjudicate cases against environmental
protection agencies and to improve the review of environmental administrative non-
litigation cases in order to support and supervise environmental government agencies'
performance of environmental protection responsibilities according to law. The courts
are also required to strictly enforce environmental and natural resources protection
laws and regulations to promote social and economic sustainable development. See
Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Wei Jia Kuai Jing Ji Fa Zhan Fang
Shi Zhuan Bian Ti Gong Si Fa Bao Zhang He Fu Wu De Ruo Gan Yi Jian(iiJt 'Rfl f l JFJA) the Supreme
People's Court's Several Opinions on Providing Judicial Guarantee and Services for
Accelerating the Transformation of the Economic Development Mode] (promulgated by the
Supreme People's Court, 2010, effective 2010) (China). See also Heyan Wang, Civil Groups
Sue A Paper Mill, and the Defendant Said It Will Not Appeal, SINA, January 18, 2011,
available at http://green.sina.com.cn/news/roll/2011-01-18/152121834363.shtml.
75. Minchun Zhang & Bao Zhang, Specialized Environmental Courts in China, INT'L B.
Ass'N. J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES (forthcoming Fall 2012).
76. Liu & Moser, supra note 73, at 222.
77. Jingjing Liu & Dejin Gu, Judicial Activism and Sustainability, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SUSTAINABILITY VOL.7: CHINA, INDIA, AND EAST AND
SOUTHEAST AISA: ASSESSING SUSTAINABILITY (forthcoming June 2012).
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the potential for increased competency and transparency in the judicial
branch itself.
Since over a decade ago, China's environmental legal academia
have been writing about environmental public interest litigation and
the potential to give standing to a broader range of individual citizens
and social groups. 8 Inspired by citizen suits in the U.S., many hope
that environmental lawsuits brought on behalf of the public interest
can help address the various obstacles that exist in traditional environ-
mental tort (pollution compensation) cases, including the exorbitant
costs of environmental lawsuits, hesitation to bring lawsuits, and the
challenges of proving causation.80 Although environmental public in-
terest litigation is theoretically not permitted under existing Chinese
law81 and involves the interests of a much broader constituency and
therefore, may seem more controversial and challenging than regular
environmental tort cases, it has so far received relatively uncommon
acceptance and support by the Chinese government. 8 2 This is partly
because the government is eager to explore solutions to China's daunt-
ing environmental problems and sees the benefits of having citizens
play a watchdog function.83 This movement is also partly because en-
vironmental public interest cases are more technical and less political,
and do not arouse as much sensitivity as those high-profile cases in-
volving constitutional issues. Support from the government, combined
with significant international efforts to train the Chinese judiciary on
78. Rachel E. Stern, On the Frontlines: Making Decisions in Chinese Civil
Environmental Lawsuits, 32 LAW & POLICY 79, 94 (2010).
79. Since 2007, the U.S.-China Partnership for Environmental Law at Vermont Law
School has received many Chinese judges, government officials, lawyers and scholars who
are interested in learning citizen suit in the U.S. and exploring how it can serve as a model
for China's environmental public interest litigation.
80. Alex Wang, The Role of Law In Environmental Protection in China: Recent
Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 220 (2007).
81. According to China's Civil Procedure Law, the plaintiff in a civil lawsuit must have
a direct interest with the lawsuit being brought. See Art.108, Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He
Guo Min Shi Su Song Fa ( AA lUN iJ VMA) [the Civil Procedure Law of the
People's Republic of China (enacted by the National People's Congress, 1991, effective 1991,
revised 2007) (China).
82. This can be evidenced through the Ministry of Environmental Protection's
willingness to introduce environmental public interest litigation by incorporating it into the
draft amendment to China's Environmental Protection Law. The latest draft amendment to
China's Civil Procedure Law included also a provision that permits relevant government
agencies and social groups to bring lawsuits against activities that infringe upon social and
public interest, such as environmental pollution or activities infringing upon the legitimate
rights and interests of multiple consumers.
83. Stern, supra note 78, at 95.
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environmental adjudication, particularly in public interest cases, 84
provides an excellent platform for judges to think creatively and ex-
plore innovative options in relatively uncharted territory. The choices
the judiciary makes today will ultimately shape the development of
China's environmental law and governance, as well as the long-term
sustainability of the world's most populous country and second largest
economy.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THREE RECENT ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC
INTEREST CASES
This section will discuss three environmental public interest
cases recently brought by a Chinese NGO and a local EPB, respec-
tively, at two specialized environmental courts, with an analysis of the
important innovations, as well as limitations, of these cases.
A. All-China Environment Federation & Guiyang Public
Environmental Education Center v. Dingpa Paper Mill of
Wudang District, Guiyang City (2010)
All-China Environment Federation (ACEF), one of the two
plaintiffs, claimed it received complaints on October 18, 2010 from re-
sidents living along the Nanming River, the so-called "Mother River" of
Guiyang City, capital of Guizhou Province in southwest China. The
complaints alleged that the defendant, Dingpa Paper Mill, had dis-
charged industrial waste water to the Nanming River and caused
water pollution.85 On October 30, ACEF sent out staff to investigate
the pollution on site, and found although the defendant did not dis-
charge industrial waste water during daytime, it discharged large
quantities of waste water to the Nanming River in the evening.86
Dingpa Paper Mill was originally built in 1993 along the downstream
of the Nanming River to produce corrugated paper from recycling used
84. In addition to the significant efforts of the U.S.-China Partnership for
Environmental Law at Vermont Law School, where I have been working for the past five
years, many U.S. NGOs and foundations, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council,
the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, the Ford Foundation, have been
playing an active role in promoting environmental lawsuits or enhanced environmental
adjudication in China, eg. improving Chinese judges' skills to write injunctive orders, weigh
between conflicting scientific evidences, craft innovative remedies to restore environmental
integrity, etc.
85. No.4 Verdict of Civil Environmental Cases of Qingzhen People's Court of First
Instance Trial (2010), at 2.
86. Id.
244
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
cardboards.87 After several renovations, the defendant was expected to
recycle all waste water (i.e. zero emission of waste water) and dis-
charge waste gas within the prescribed limit and therefore, the
pollution discharge permit issued by the local EPB allowed the defen-
dant to discharge sulfur dioxide and dust only, not waste water.88
However, the defendant did not heed the EPB's requirement of strictly
treating and recycling waste water, and simply built two water tanks
with a total storing capacity of 800 cubic meters and transferred waste
water to the tanks for deposition.89 Since 2003, the defendant was im-
posed administrative penalties by the local EPB on several occasions
for secretly discharging waste water to the Nanming River or discharg-
ing waste gas exceeding the prescribed limits.90
Based on evidence gathered by the plaintiffs prior to the law-
suit, evidence preserved by the Qingzhen Environmental Court, as
well as admission by the defendant's legal representative during evi-
dence preservation by the court, the defendant did not treat the waste
water at all, and simply transferred the waste water to the tanks for
deposition during daytime and discharged the waste water secretly at
night to the Nanming River.9 1 Commissioned by the court, Guiyang
Environmental Center Monitoring Station sampled the waste water
discharged by the defendant, and found the concentration of ammonia
nitrogen, chemical oxygen demand, and biochemical oxygen demand
all far exceeded national emission standards. Further, the water qual-
ity of downstream Nanming River near the defendant's discharge pipe
was graded less than five,9 2 which means the water cannot be used for
industrial or agricultural purposes.
In November 2010, ACEF teamed up with Guiyang Public Envi-
ronmental Education Center to jointly bring public interest litigation
at Qingzhen Environmental Court, requesting the defendant to imme-
diately stop illegal discharge of waste water to the Nanming River, pay
for 10,000 RMB ($1,587)93 of attorney's fee incurred by the plaintiffs,
and cover relevant litigation expenses. 94 On December 10, 2010, the
plaintiffs requested the court issue a preliminary injunction requiring
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 7.
92. Id.
93. The exchange rate between USD and RMB as of April 23, 2012 is 1:6.3. See http:l
www.exchange-rates.org/history/CNY/USD/T.
94. No.4 Verdict of Civil Environmental Cases of Qingzhen People's Court of First
Instance Trial (2010), at 1-3.
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the defendant to stop illegal discharge of industrial waste water imme-
diately, prior to the final judgment of the case. The court granted the
preliminary injunction.95
On December 30, 2010, the court issued the decision, which rec-
ognized that the two plaintiffs, as lawfully registered environmental
protection organizations, can represent the public environmental inter-
est and bring a lawsuit when the public interest is being infringed
upon and there is no specific victim to bring the lawsuit.9 6 Bringing
such an environmental public interest lawsuit fully reflects the fact
that environmental organizations and groups in China have actively
participated in environmental management, supervised the implemen-
tation of environmental law, and promoted environmental protection
efforts.97 The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the
defendant to stop discharging waste water to the Nanming River im-
mediately, pay for 10,000 RMB ($1,587) of attorney's fees to ACEF, pay
for water sampling fee of 1,500 RMB ($238) to Guiyang Two Lakes and
One Reservoir Foundation who prepaid this fee, and cover the case ac-
ceptance fee of 60 RMB ($10).98
This case has received significant attention from the environ-
mental legal community in China, because it is the first successful
environmental civil public interest case brought by an environmental
NGO.99 Peking University environmental law professor Jin Wang 00
gave very positive comments regarding this case, calling it "the first
complete environmental civil public interest litigation case."101 There
95. Heyan Wang, Civil Groups Sue A Paper Mill, and the Defendant Said It Will Not
Appeal, SINA, January 18, 2011, available at http://green.sina.com.cn/news/roll/2011-01-18/
152121834363.shtml.
96. No.4 Verdict of Civil Environmental Cases of Qingzhen People's Court of First
Instance Trial (2010), at 10-11.
97. Id. at 10.
98. Id. at 10-11.
99. Shixin Liu, Why Did China's First Environmental Public Interest Case Adjudicated
In Guizhou Province? CHINA YoUTH DAILY, January 20, 2011, http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2011-
01/20/nw.DllO000zgqnb-20110120_1-05.htm?div=-1. 1. In addition, ACEF brought a
lawsuit against a container company in Jiangyin Port, Jiangsu Province, for air and water
pollution in 2009. This was the first environmental public interest case brought by an
environmental NGO in China, and both parties in this case reached an agreement mediated
by the court.
100. Professor Jin Wang is arguably the first law professor experimenting with
environmental public interest litigation in China. After the Songhua River benzene spill in
2005, he and several other professors and students from Peking University brought a civil
environmental public interest lawsuit on behalf of the Xunhuang Fish, the Songhua River
as well as the Sun Island who were polluted by the benzene spill. This is the first time
natural objects such as fish serve as plaintiffs in a civil environmental public interest
lawsuit in China. The case was not accepted by court. See Shixin Liu, supra note 99.
101. Id.
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are several important innovations related to this case that should be
pointed out. First, the court granted the plaintiffs' request to preserve
evidence related to the defendant's illegal discharge activities, and sent
court staff to the pollution site early in the morning to collect and pre-
serve the evidence related to the defendant's secret discharge of waste
water.102 In environmental litigation, it is crucial and difficult, to ob-
tain relevant evidence. Here, the court's efforts to preserve important
evidence not only helped facilitate this particular lawsuit, but also set
a good precedent for other courts to follow.103
Second, as mentioned previously, the court issued a preliminary
injunction prior to the judgment. According to Judge Guangqian Luo
who presided over this case, if the court waited until the judgment to
order the defendant to stop discharging waste water, the defendant
may have continued to polluting the environment while the case was
pending.104 A preliminary injunction forces the defendant to stop its
illegal discharge before the final judgment is rendered, thus ensuring
timely and effective mitigation of the negative impacts upon the local
environment. 105
Third, this is the first public interest case in which the ap-
praisal fee was covered by a foundation. 0 6 Due to the complexity and
technicality of environmental litigation, upfront costs related to envi-
ronmental quality sampling, appraisal of environmental harm and
economic loss can be substantial, and sometimes the financial burden
alone may deter NGOs and individuals from bringing an environmen-
tal public interest lawsuit. Even before this case, the court reached a
consensus with Guiyang Two Lakes and One Reservoir Foundation
that the latter would provide financial support to relevant assessment,
appraisal and monitoring expenses resulting from environmental pub-
lic interest lawsuits. 107 In this case, the plaintiffs applied to Guiyang
Two Lakes and One Reservoir Foundation to cover the water sampling
fee, and the foundation prepaid the expense based on the court's
recommendation.10
102. Zhijiang Yan, New Measures Taken by the Environmental Courts to Resolve
Difficult Issues in Adjudication, LEGAL DAILY, January 4, 2011, available at http://www.
legaldaily.com.cn/bm/content/2011-01/04/content_2425760.htm?node=20733.
103. Although China is a civil law country and cases generally do not have precedential
effect, good judicial practices do travel around and can potentially be picked up by other
courts when handling similar cases.
104. Shixin Liu, supra note 99.
105. Zhijiang Yan, supra note 102.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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In addition, the court was willing to take suggestions from an
environmental expert consultation committee into consideration when
identifying the proper enforcement action that would achieve the objec-
tives of the court's decision.' 09 Given the lack of professional
institutions specialized in appraising pollution damages in China, as
well as the length of time and high costs required to appraise causation
and the scope of environmental harm, Qingzhen Environmental Court
established an environmental expert consultation committee in 2008.
This committee provides professional opinions on relevant technical is-
sues in pending environmental public interest lawsuits." 0 According
to the experts on this committee, Dingpa Paper Mill is a pollution-in-
tensive and energy-intensive small enterprise, and in order to stop
discharging waste water to Nanming River, it needs significant fund-
ing for pollution treatment facilities and a sound management system,
which prove to be difficult to achieve given its current situation."' As
a result, the experts recommended shutting down Dingpa Paper Mill,
which is the only way to thoroughly stop discharging pollution.112 Ac-
cording to Judge Luo, under existing law the court cannot directly
order the defendant to shut down its production line, but it would send
out notice to relevant government agencies to ask for their assistance
in stopping pollution discharge. One possibility would be urging the
polluter to rectify within a certain period of time or shut down the pol-
luting facility.113
Lastly, the court ruled that the losing party in this case, the
defendant, would be responsible for the attorney's fees prepaid by
ACEF. The standard practice in China is that each party to a civil
lawsuit bears its own attorney's fees, but in this case the court ordered
the losing party to bear the attorney's fees incurred by ACEF. This
will certainly help ACEF to reduce its financial burden for the pursuit
of public interests, and will encourage other public interest minded
groups and individuals to bring similar lawsuits in the long run.
Despite the above-mentioned noteworthy innovations in this
case, ACEF is keenly aware of its limitations. According to ACEF's
litigation department director, Dingpa Paper Mill is a small plant that
109. Shixin Liu, supra note 99.
110. Qingzhen Environmental Court Actively Explore Innovative Adjudication Practices
to Safeguard the Construction of Ecological Civilization, GuIZHOU COURT, November 30,
2010, available at http://www.guizhoucourt.gov.cn/viewarticle.aspx?id=204.
111. Shixin Liu, supra note 99.
112. Id.
113. Id.
248
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
has an annual production capacity of only 6,000 tons. 14 If the defen-
dant is a major company that makes significant contribution to local
tax revenue, it is difficult to predict whether a lawsuit against such a
big player will be accepted by a court or if accepted, will be decided
fairly.115 This case also has some unresolved issues. The defendant
not only secretly discharged waste water without a valid permit, the
waste water it discharged significantly exceeded the national emission
standards and caused severe pollution to the Nanming River." 6 How-
ever, the plaintiffs only asked for an injunction, compensation of the
attorney's fees, and the case acceptance fee without requesting the de-
fendant to compensate the environmental harm" 7 or pay for the costs
to restore the bio-integrity of the Nanming River. The total amount of
the attorney's fees and the case acceptance fee is only 10,060 RMB
($1,597). Compared to the economic benefits the defendant has gar-
nered from illegal discharge and the costs of restoring the water
quality of the Nanming River,"i8 this amount is only a "drop in the
bucket" and will not prevent the defendant or other similarly posi-
tioned polluters from further violations." 9
B. Kunming Municipal EPB v. Kunming Sannong Agriculture and
Animal Husbandry Company and Kunming Yangpu United
Animal Husbandry Company (2010)
Starting in June 2008, the two defendants in this case subcon-
tracted animal farm lands to more than 200 pig farmers, even though
the pollution treatment facilities of the land had not yet passed the
completion examination.120 According to the agreement signed by the
defendants with the individual pig farmers, the pig farmers were re-
sponsible for constructing their own pig-raising facilities and operating
the business on their own. The defendants were responsible for land
114. Heyan Wang, supra note 95.
115. Id.
116. No.4 Verdict of Civil Environmental Cases of Qingzhen People's Court of First
Instance Trial (2010), at 7.
117. ACEF did express at trial that it reserved the right to pursue claims over the
environmental harm caused by the defendant. See Heyan Wang, supra note 95.
118. Dingpa Paper Mill paid only around 600,000 RMB ($95,238) of tax annually, and
this was hardly enough to pay for Nanming River's pollution clean-up cost. On the other
hand, the illegal discharge of waste water by Dingpa Paper Mill saved itself a substantial
amount of pollution levy. See Heyan Wang, supra note 95.
119. Unlike the U.S., there is no civil penalty under existing Chinese environmental
laws to deter polluters.
120. No.lVerdict of Civil Environmental Cases of Kunming Intermediate People's Court
of First Instance Trial (2010), at 18.
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administration, epidemic prevention, and pollution treatment; with pig
farmers paying a fee for the service. 121 After the pig farmers started to
raise pigs in their subcontracted lands, the waste water resulting from
pig farming seeped into the underground water system and caused the
drinking water source for a local village less than 1,000 meters from
the contracted farm land to be seriously contaminated. This occurred
because the defendants' pollution treatment facilities had not yet
passed the environmental impact evaluation. 122 Local residents and
animals that relied upon this drinking water source had difficulty ac-
cessing clean drinking water. The multiple water samplings conducted
by local environmental monitoring authority confirmed the concentra-
tion of ammonia nitrogen and Escherichia coli in the contaminated
drinking water source far exceeded the acceptable level.123
As a result of the water pollution, Local EPB ordered one of the
defendants, the Sannong Company, to stop pig farming and pay a fine
of half a million RMB ($79,365).124 The Sannong Company paid the
fine in two installments, but the waste water from pig farming seeped
into the underground water system again in early 2010, and the con-
centrations of relevant pollutants still exceeded the allowable limits
according to the most recent water sampling conducted on December 6,
2010.125 In order to prove the scope of the environmental harm caused
by these water pollution incidents, Kunming Municipal EPB commis-
sioned Kunming Environmental Science Academy to conduct an
assessment, and the conclusion of the assessment specified it would
take 3.64 million RMB ($577,778) to build the pollution treatment fa-
cility plus 532,700 RMB ($84,556) to operate the facility annually.126
In June 2010, Kunming Municipal EPB, with the support from
Kunming Municipal People's Procuratorate,127 brought a public inter-
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3, 18.
123. Id. at 18-19.
124. Id. at 19.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 15.
127. The procuratorate is the highest organ for legal supervision in China. Armed with
extensive powers, the Chinese procuratorates cannot only conduct criminal investigations
and prosecutions, but also exercise supervision of the police as well as the courts to ensure
they act in accordance with the law. If for certain reasons the victim of a tortious action is
not able to take his claim to court, the procuratorate can step in to support the victim to
bring a lawsuit so as to ensure justice is served. See Jingjing Liu, China's Procuratorate In
Environmental Civil Enforcement: Practice, Challenges & Implications for China's
Environmental Governance, 12 VT. J. ENvrL. L. (forthcoming Spring 2012). This article
provides further information on Chinese procuratorate's role in promoting environmental
public interest litigation in China.
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est lawsuit at the environmental tribunal of Kunming Intermediate
People's Court (the Kunming Court) against the two defendants, and
requested them to (1) stop damaging the environment immediately, (2)
pay for all expenses related to pollution treatment of the local drinking
water source, estimated to be 4.17 million RMB ($661,905)128, (3) pay
for 155, 293 RMB ($24,650) for environmental emergency monitoring
fees (22, 773 RMB) ($3,615) resulting from managing the water pollu-
tion incidents and assessment fee (132,520 RMB) ($21,035) for
pollution remediation costs, and (4) cover litigation expenses of this
case.129 The Sannong Company did not deny that the pollutants re-
sulting from pig farming seeped into the underground water system
and caused pollution to the local drinking water source, but argued it
took measures immediately after water pollution occurred to ensure
access to drinking water and sold all of the pigs it raised by October
2010.130 In addition, the Sannong Company called for the Kunming
Court's attention to the fact it had already been imposed an adminis-
trative penalty.' 3
In January 2011, the Kunming Court issued its decision, which
affirmed the Kunming EPB's standing to represent the state in a pub-
lic interest lawsuit against the two defendants by referring to the
Environmental Protection Law. The Court also relied upon a piece of
the Supreme People's Court's judicial interpretation that requires the
courts to hear pollution compensation cases brought by environmental
protection agencies on behalf of the state. 132 The decision stated that
although the two defendants resolved the villagers' drinking water
problem, their pollution treatment facilities had not yet passed the en-
vironmental impact evaluation. Although the two defendants no
longer raised pigs, the individual pig farmers currently did and contin-
ued to discharge waste water.133 The two defendants were responsible
for providing unified waste water treatment facilities, according to the
agreements with these individual pig farmers. Therefore, the two de-
fendants should be liable for the individual pig farmers' activities of
discharging waste water and polluting the environment.134 The court
also distinguished civil liability and administrative punishment, and
128. As mentioned above, this includes 3.64 million RMB to build the pollution
treatment facility plus 532,700 RMB to operate the facility annually.
129. No.1 Verdict of Civil Environmental Cases of Kunming Intermediate People's
Court of First Instance Trial (2010), at 2, 4.
130. Id. at 5.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 20, 21, and 24.
133. Id. at 21.
134. Id.
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concluded although the defendants had already shouldered adminis-
trative penalties; it should not offset their civil liabilities.135 Finally,
the court ruled for the plaintiff, and ordered the two defendants to stop
damaging the environment immediately, pay 4.17 million RMB
($661,905) to Kunming Environmental Public Interest Litigation Spe-
cial Fund (the Fund) for pollution remediation, pay 132,520 RMB
($21,035) to the Fund for assessment fee for pollution remediation
costs, and cover the case acceptance fee of 40,177 RMB ($6,377).136
The two defendants appealed the decision to Yunnan Provincial Peo-
ple's High Court, which affirmed the judgment in May 2011.137
This was the first environmental public interest lawsuit in Yun-
nan Province, almost two years after the Kunming Court was
established with the purpose of promoting public interest litigation.138
There are many reasons which contribute to the lack of public interest
cases. First, many of the environmental courts/tribunals were estab-
lished in response to serious environmental disasters and the
associated political needs to display the government's good-will to-
wards environmental protection, not because there are already a
steady flow of environmental cases in the places where these environ-
mental courts/tribunals are established. Second, environmental cases
are generally more complicated, technical, and expensive to litigate
than other types of cases. Many potential plaintiffs, particularly NGOs
and individuals, lack either the legal skills, financial resources, or both
to bring an environmental public interest lawsuit. In addition, China
is still in the process of developing a critical mass of well-trained, pub-
lic-minded environmental lawyers, and could benefit enormously from
an environmental bar capable of putting these environmental courts/
tribunals to good use.
From a pragmatic point of view, it is understandable that
Kunming Court may want to carefully pick its first environmental pub-
lic interest case to ensure it is the "right" case, particularly after such
an unexpected long wait. In fact, one month before the Kunming EPB
brought this lawsuit, in May 2010, Chongqing Green Volunteers
135. Id. at 22.
136. Id. at 23. The court considered the monitoring fees to be part of the standard costs
incurred by the day-to-day work of environmental protection agencies and therefore, should
not be borne by the two defendants.
137. Yang Yang, Yunnan Province Adjudicated the First Environmental Public Interest
Litigation Case and Compensation Went to A Special Fund, CHINANEWS.COM, May 31, 2011,
available at http://www.chinanews.com/fz/2011/05-31/3080545.shtml.
138. Dengke Meng, Wielding A Big Bat to Beat A Mosquito: Inside Stories of the First
Environmental Public Interest Case in Yunnan Province, SOUTHERN WEEKEND, October 1,
2010, available at http://www.infzm.com/content/50783.
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Union, a well-known grassroots environmental NGO in southwest
China, filed a public interest lawsuit against Guo Dian Yang Zong Hai
Power Plant (Yang Zong Hai) at the Kunming Court.139 Yang Zong
Hai is the largest sulfur dioxide emitter in Kunming and one of the
most serious polluters in Yunnan Province. 140 If the case against Yang
Zong Hai was accepted by Kunming Court, it would be the first envi-
ronmental public interest case brought by a grassroots NGO in
China,141 with the defendant being a major state-owned enterprise.
Potentially, it might be a precedent-setting case and help elevate the
profile of the Kunming Court and potentially even the environmental
courts/tribunals in the entire Yunnan Province.
The plaintiff actually discussed the Yang Zong Hai case with
judges from Kunming Court prior to filing this case, and decided to file
this case only after receiving positive feedback from the judges that
this would be a good case. 142 The plaintiff argued that Yang Zong Hai,
in clear violation of national and Yunnan provincial laws, intentionally
and fraudulently prolonged repairs that led to irregular use of its de-
sulfurization units for a long period of time. In addition, the plaintiff
requested a set of relatively unique civil remedies that perfectly
demonstrated the public interest nature of this case.143 The remedies
requested included an order that Yang Zong Hai adopt effective rectifi-
cation measures for properly using its desulfurization equipment and
ensure its sulfur emissions meet relevant emission standards and
targets. It also included a request for an order that Yang Zong Hai
provide plans for controlling nitrogen oxide and carbon dioxide emis-
sions and implement the plans after court approval, as well as
payment of 3,000,000 RMB ($476,190) to the Kuming EPB who would
use it to establish a fund devoted to supporting environmental public
interest litigation. 144
However, in the end, the Kunming Court did not give a clear
answer on acceptance of the lawsuit filed against Yang Zong Hai, and
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. ACEF, the plaintiff in the Dingpa Paper Mill case, has strong ties with China's
Ministry of Environmental Protection, and is generally not considered a true, independent
NGO. To a certain degree, because of its connection with the top environmental agency in
the country, it is relatively easier for ACEF to bring environmental public interest cases of
experimental nature than an NGO without such government background.
142. Adam Moser & Benjamin K. Sovacool, Public Participation in China's Energy
Governance: The Non-Case of Chongqing Green Volunteers v. Guodian Yangzonghai Power
Company, Energy Governance Case Study #13, LKY, at 9, December 2011, available at
http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/docs/energy-case/%2313-China.pdf.
143. Id. at 10.
144. Id. at 10-11.
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the Kunming EPB, instead of a grassroots environmental NGO, be-
came the plaintiff of the first environmental public interest case in
Yunnan Province.145 On one hand, it is disappointing that the Kunm-
ing Court conducted "selective judicial enforcement" by picking a
relatively easier case against two private pig farms over a powerful,
large state-owned enterprise. 14 6 On the other hand, it is understanda-
ble that the Kunming Court wanted to be cautious with its first
environmental public interest case, and taking on a big polluter that
has strong government connections might be too risky and controver-
sial. In particular, given the enormous difficulty the Chinese judiciary
has experienced in enforcing its own civil awards,147 it will be much
easier for the court to enforce a ruling against two small private enti-
ties than against one of China's largest power generators. 14 8 If the
court's first environmental public interest case cannot be properly en-
forced, it might set a less desirable precedent for the Kunming Court's
future endeavors in entertaining public interest lawsuits. Despite the
disappointing selective judicial enforcement, the case brought by the
Kunming EPB against two pig farms was awarded the largest amount
of civil compensation ever in a single environmental public interest
lawsuit. This factor will play an active role in helping deter and edu-
cate other polluting enterprises and individuals from committing
similar environmental violations.149
C. All-China Environment Federation v. Xiuwen County
Environmental Protection Bureau of Guizhou
Province (2012)
In October 2011, ACEF brought an environmental public inter-
est case in the Qingzhen Environmental Court against a dairy
company in Guizhou Province for excessive discharge of industrial
wastewater.o5 0 Since this case required ACEF to collect relevant envi-
ronmental information regarding the dairy company, ACEF submitted
145. Dengke Meng, supra note 138.
146. Kunming EPB even looked into the defendants' ability to pay for what it requested
in this case, and concluded that the defendants should be able to pay for 4.3 million RMB of
compensation. See Dengke Meng, supra note 138.
147. It is estimated that as many as 50% of civil awards went unenforced. See RANDALL
PEERENBOOM, CHINA's LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAw 287 (Cambridge University Press
2002).
148. Moser & Sovacool, supra note 142, at 11.
149. Yang Yang, supra note 137.
150. No.1 Verdict of Environmental Cases of Qingzhen People's Court of First Instance
Trial (2012), at 6.
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an application to the defendant, the Xiuwen County EPB, for disclo-
sure of the following information: The dairy company's pollution
discharge permit, the number and location of its pollution discharge
outlets, the type and amount of the pollutants discharged, the pollution
levy standard determined by the EPB, the pollution monitoring record
and administrative penalty imposed by the EPB, and the environmen-
tal impact assessment documents, etc.151 After receiving this open
information request, the defendant determined that the content and
format of the information requested by the plaintiff, as well as the
means of obtaining such information, were not clear or specific, and
that the plaintiff did not pay for relevant costs to locate, copy and mail
such information.152 The plaintiff brought a public interest lawsuit
against Xiuwen EPB for its failure to disclose the information re-
quested or reply to the application within the legally prescribed period
of time, in violation of the Open Government Information Regula-
tions 153 of the State Council and the Environmental Information
Disclosure Measures1 54 of the Ministry of Environmental Protection. 155
The court wrote in its decision that obtaining environmental in-
formation through legal channels is an important right of the citizens
as well as an important means to ensure public participation in envi-
ronmental protection.156 The court went on to assert that "disclosure
of environmental information should be the general rule, while non-
disclosure should be the exception."157 The court determined that the
plaintiffs requested information falls within the scope of government
environmental information that can legally be disclosed and does not
involve state secrets, commercial secrets, or personal privacy.15 8 The
court decided that the plaintiff properly completed the open informa-
tion application form, and the content of the information it requested is
clear and detailed.159 Even if the defendant considered the content of
the information requested by the plaintiff unclear, the defendant failed
151. Id.
152. Id. at 4.
153. Zheng Fu Xin Xi Gong Kai Tiao Li ( ggggyfkWJ) [Open Government
Information Regulations] (promulgated by the State Council, 2007, effective 2008) (China).
154. Huan Jing Xin Xi Gong Kai Ban Fa (Shi Xing) (fig(T))
[Environmental Information Disclosure Measures (for Trial Implementation)] (promulgated
by the Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2007, effective 2008) (China).
155. No.1 Verdict of Environmental Cases of Qingzhen People's Court of First Instance
Trial (2012), at 2.
156. Id. at 6.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 7.
159. Id. at 7-8.
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to issue to the applicant a notice to rectify the application according to
law, and the notice should instruct the applicant on how to make recti-
fications or provide further information.160 In terms of costs related to
information disclosure, the court held that although government agen-
cies can require applicants to cover costs related to locate, copy, and
mail requested information, the defendant did not ask the plaintiff to
pay for relevant costs and the plaintiff did not explicitly say that it
would not pay for such costs and therefore, the defendant's claim can-
not be substantiated.' 6 ' On January 10, 2012, the court ruled in favor
of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to reply to the open govern-
ment information application filed by ACEF and disclose relevant
environmental information of the dairy company within ten days after
the judgment becomes effective. 1 6 2 The court also decided to waive the
case acceptance fee of 50 RMB ($8).163 Later, the defendant appealed
the decision to the Guiyang Intermediate People's Court, but withdrew
the appeal at the last minute before the trial, leaving this decision in
effect. 164
When the Open Government Information Regulations were
promulgated in 2007, it was widely praised as a milestone to increase
government transparency and accountability. This law is particularly
meaningful given China's deeply rooted tradition of withholding infor-
mation from the public.165 Ancient rulers in China were concerned
about the moral and political risks associated with public promulgation
of legal norms.166 Although such concerns related to making the law
accessible to the public have long gone, many officials still have the
mindset of keeping government activities in secrecy 67 for the sake of
convenience and avoiding accountability. In a political culture in
which non-disclosure of governmental information is the rule and dis-
closure is the exception, the Open Government Information
Regulations could play an important role in empowering citizens to de-
160. Id. at 8.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 10.
163. Id.
164. Email exchange with the plaintiffs lawyer on April 11, 2012 (email on file with the
author).
165. TOD KAISER & RONGKUN Liu, TAKING THE PULSE: THE ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF
CHINA'S OPEN GoVERNMENT INFORMATION MEASURES 1 (China Environment Forum 2009),
available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ogi-final21.pdf
166. DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAw IN IMPERIAL CHINA 17 (University of
Pennsylvania Press 1973).
167. See KAISER & Liu, supra note 165, at 5.
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mand information and in reshaping the relationship between a
powerful government and a nascent civil society.168
Although the Open Government Information Regulations re-
quires various levels of governments to proactively disclose applicable
government information or disclose upon open government information
requests from citizens, legal persons or other organizations,1 6 9 it suf-
fers from inadequate and uneven enforcement in the environmental
field.170 Some EPBs are concerned about the potential impacts that
disclosing environmental information may have on business invest-
ment in their jurisdictions. 7 1 Concern of data inaccuracy as a result of
relatively underdeveloped monitoring capacity in central and western
China is another contributing factor to inadequate disclosure. 172 On
other occasions, EPBs at the lowest administrative level do not have a
clear idea on how and to what degree to open environmental
information. 173
In order to provide a comprehensive picture on efforts to dis-
close environmental information to the public, the Institute of Public
and Environmental Affairs (IPE), a Beijing-based environmental NGO
dedicated to promoting environmental information disclosure and pub-
lic participation, and the Natural Resources Defense Council
established the Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI) in
2009 and have recently completed their third annual assessment of en-
vironmental information disclosure among 113 selected cities across
the country.174 The assessment criteria of the PITI includes publica-
tion of records of violations of environmental standards and rules,
information related to the overall evaluation of enterprises' environ-
mental behavior, information related to complaints and how these
complaints are handled, information related to pollution levy, informa-
tion disclosure upon requests and several other indicators.17 5 The
168. Id. at 1.
169. Articles 9-13, Zheng Fu Xin Xi Gong Kai Tiao Li (Rriff.91)a J) [Open
Government Information Regulations] (promulgated by the State Council, 2007, effective
2008) (China).
170. Xianghui Zhang, The 2011 Ratings of the Pollution Information Transparency
Index Is Released, XIAOXIANG MORNING NEWS, February 14, 2012, available at http://www.
xxcb.cn/show.asp?id=1155185.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Assessment of Open Environmental Information In the Past Three Years:
2011 Annual Evaluation Results of Pollution Information Transparency Index of
113 Chinese Cities, January 16, 2012, available at http://www.ipe.org.cn//Upload/IPE
Eg4-/5fFI ~ajT_ t-,_201 14fPITI lff- .pdf, at 3.
175. Id., at 50-51.
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average PITI rating for 2011 was 40.14 of 100, which represents an
increase of 4.17 from 2009-2010 and 9.08 from 2008.176 Also, 19 out of
the 113 cities surveyed met the passing score of 60, compared to 11 in
2009-2010 and 4 in 2008.177 Despite such modest progress, the mere
fact that less than 17% of all the cities surveyed met the passing score
indicates that there is significant room for improvement to ensure citi-
zens' adequate access to information.
As China's first environmental public interest case involving
open government information and called by the media "a victory of the
people,"r17 the case of ACEF v. Xiuwen EPB will play an important role
in promoting public access to environmental information, which is the
prerequisite for meaningful public participation in environmental pro-
tection. Average citizens have limited means and resources to collect
such information, which could potentially be critical evidence in envi-
ronmental lawsuits. By requesting the basic information of a polluter's
pollution activities, including its pollution record and history of en-
forcement by environmental agencies, pollution victims and public-
minded professionals obtain a powerful weapon to pursue their envi-
ronmental claims more effectively. 179
V. CONCLUSION
While environmental justice is interpreted more broadly in
China to imply the need for better environmental governance, the en-
forcement of environmental laws has been uneven and challenging.
Despite encouraging developments in the past several years, there is
still significant room for improvement to ensure meaningful public par-
ticipation in government environmental decision-making. In recent
years, environmental public interest litigation has become one of the
hotly debated issues among Chinese environmental professionals, most
of whom view it as an important means to achieve improved environ-
mental justice for all members of the society.
176. Id. at 9.
177. Id. at 15.
178. Guilin Qian, the Victory of All-China Environment Federation Is "A Victory of the
People", LEGAL DAILY, January 20, 2012, available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/
commentary/content/2012-01/20/content_3315843.htm?node=34252.
179. For example, the plaintiff in the case against Yang Zong Hai acknowledged that
the Open Government Information Regulations emboldened it to file this lawsuit with the
Kunming Court, because it was able to take advantage of the increased public disclosure of
pollution information to obtain the evidence of Yang Zong Hai's violations. See MOSER &
SoVACOL, supra note 142, at 8.
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The three cases appearing in the discussions above have shown
some of the enforcement efforts made by the judiciary to address
China's pervasive and severe pollution problems, particularly when
the polluters do not take administrative enforcement measures seri-
ously. In two of the three cases, local EPBs imposed administrative
penalties on the polluters, but the administrative actions did not curb
the pollution activities.180 This illustrates the urgent need to involve
the Chinese judiciary in the enforcement efforts to make sure the en-
acted environmental laws do not stay only on the paper. Despite the
constraints on the standing issue under existing Chinese law, many
environmental courts/tribunals are experimenting with liberalized
standing to allow for public interest litigation,181 and such bottom-up
efforts will provide experiences and support to the change of national
laws.
By entertaining a growing number of environmental public in-
terest cases, judges at these environmental courts/tribunals have
accrued experience in adjudicating public interest cases, gradually
built the confidence to hear more complicated and technical environ-
mental disputes, and become increasingly sophisticated in crafting
innovative and practical solutions to ameliorating China's daunting
environmental problems. Through developing special rules to promote
public interest litigation, gradually formalizing the procedures of hear-
ing public interest case and developing complementing mechanisms,
such as the environmental public interest fund, to support litigation
efforts, these environmental courts/tribunals have become pioneers in
leading China's environmental public interest litigation path, and
their efforts will likely encourage regular courts to accept these types
of cases.
Although some environmental courts have displayed a greater
willingness to take on more difficult cases and a greater degree of inno-
vation in exploring solutions to environmental problems, 182 overall
most of the civil environmental public interest cases brought so far are
180. The two cases are All-China Environment Federation & Guiyang Public
Environmental Education Center v. Dingpa Paper Mill of Wudang District, Guiyang City
(2010) and Kunming Municipal EPB v. Kunming Sannong Agriculture and Animal
Husbandry.
181. For example, environmental public interest litigations are permitted by
environmental courts/tribunals in Kunming, Yunnan Province, Guiyang, Guizhou Province,
and Wuxi, Jiangsu Province. See e.g. Several Provisions Regarding Dealing with
Environmental Civil Public Interest Cases (for Trial Implementation) (promulgated by
Kunming Intermediate People's Court & Kunming Intermediate People's Procuratorate,
Oct. 2010, effective Nov. 2010) (China).
182. Alex Wang, Green Litigation in China Today, CHINA DIALOGUE, July 18, 2011,
available at http://www.chinadialogue.netarticle/show/single/en/4413.
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relatively "easier" cases that involve small or medium-sized enter-
prises or individuals as defendants and have relatively straightforward
facts and solid evidence in favor of the plaintiffs. 8 3 With few excep-
tions,184 the courts have not yet taken on landscape-changing or
precedent-setting cases that involve powerful defendants that have ei-
ther much sway over the government or much deeper pockets, or cases
that are very complicated, controversial and require judges to adjudi-
cate between competing social values. It is particularly disappointing
in the Yang Zong Hai case that, the Kunming Court, as an intermedi-
ate-level court, was statutorily and pragmatically in a good position to
take on a case that involves a powerful, high-profile defendant, but at
the end chose not to do so. Hopefully, as the courts continue to experi-
ment with adjudicating environmental public interest cases and
gradually build the knowledge, skill and confidence, they will be able
to avoid selective enforcement and start taking on much more difficult
and controversial cases that will ultimately shape China's environmen-
tal governance landscape and ensure environmental justice to all.
183. Such selective enforcement has also occurred in civil environmental public interest
cases brought by China's procuratorates. Most of the public interest cases handled by the
procuratorates so far had relatively clear facts supported by strong evidence against
defendants who were usually individuals or small to medium-sized, privately owned
businesses. See Jingjing Liu, China's Procuratorate In Environmental Civil Enforcement:
Practice, Challenges & Implications for China's Environmental Governance, 12 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. (forthcoming Spring 2012).
184. One of such exceptions is a chromium pollution case currently pending in front of
an environmental tribunal of Yunnan Province. This is the first environmental public
interest case brought by grassroots NGOs in China, and the defendants are two major
chemical plants in the local area.
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